Subject: Revised: "In Denfense of Sociobiology"Any successful defense of the sociobiologists' claims that morality
can be naturalized must show that biology is reducible to universal
physical laws, at the same time that it demonstrates how evolution,
via Darwinian principles, explains value, ethics, religion, etc. The
former task is an easier one, in so far as there exist well-defined
theories, and even reproducible data, which attempt to bridge the
divide between nonlife and life. This essay therefore describes why
biology has the potential to be naturalized, before moving to a
discussion of why ethics has the potential to be Darwinized. That
one could produce rigorous evidence which shifts our sense of a
sociobiological explanation from "potentially true" to
"unquestionably true" is not at all clear. To steal Rolston's own
modest aim, the argument presented here attempts to create
possibility space for sociobiological reduction within the framework
of a new evolutionary metaphor of shared value.
The model by which gases produced just after the Big Bang come
together to yield chemistry is precisely predicted by the same
mathematics we use to describe cosmological events today. One has
every reason to assume, therefore, that the elements from which life
is formed are themselves fully accounted for by the natural laws of
the universe. The transition from inanimate chemicals to
information-packed life is generally considered more problematic, but
on several occasions amino acids, sugars and other macromolecules
have been produced by merely exposing basic chemicals to lightening
or another energy source. That DNA's informational value emerges
from the atoms which comprise it in some sense surprising, but this
"information" is really an abstraction for "molecules that faithfully
replicate." Presumably, the formation of molecules for which there
is a suitable replication mechanism (i.e., chemically complementary
base pairs) is all that is required for the initiation of sustainable
life. There is good reason to believe that mitotic cells will soon
be produced from conditions similar to those which yielded organic
molecules.
What are frequently lumped together are the concepts of
"reducibility" and "predictability." No one can claim that
biological/evolutionary processes are predictable from physics and
chemistry, but there is also no reason to assume that biology is not
reducible to chemistry and physics (that is, if given enough time and
effort it could be done). Informational value is an unpredictable
novelty, but a novelty that is nonetheless fully explainable (though
not predictable) given chemical laws and initial conditions. Rolston
says that "new factors arise in the higher science (biology) with
which the lower science (physics) is unable to deal...Physics and
chemistry, the two prior sciences, do not provide the critically
important interpretive categories, those of information discovery and
transfer, with which to understand the superposed phenomena"
(Rolston, 150-151). But it is not that physics and chemistry are
incapable of producing biology all on their own; they are, in
practice though not in theory, incapable of retrospectively
unravelling the complexity of biology. Ultimately, there are no gaps
for which a "God of the gaps" is necessary; there is just the
emergence of complexity too intertwined to be feasibly dissected, and
too contingent to be predicted.
Photosynthesis and the eye, the two classic examples of
"technologies" considered too complex to be "just chemistry," both
lend themselves to natural explanations. During the development of
the fetus, the eye takes shape in much the same way as it likely
evolved-- a single cell differentiating into multiple cells, each now
localized to a different region of the organism and therefore under
differential regulatory control. Certain cells, due to their
location, express certain genes; other cells, due to their location,
express others. The result is a highly coordinated, specialized
structure that is actually profound evidence for evolution rather
than evidence against it (as creationists often contend). Likewise
with photosynthesis. Preconscious (or more appropriately,
preconscience) life, if one were to continue in this manner
indefinitely, is reducible.
The greater task remains, however, to show that naturalized biology
has the potential to explain morality and ethics. Rolston's central
counterargument to this possibility is that those who Darwinize
ethics but profess "oughts" enter into what he terms a "naturalistic
paradox" (Rolston, 268). Wilson, Dawkins and Alexander, he claims,
provide no theoretical basis for their actions, and are therefore
self-contradictory when they suggest that anything "ought to be."
Because Wilson says "Wilderness has virtue unto itself and needs no
extraneous justification" (Rolston, quoting Wilson, 267), and because
Dawkins talks of "Generosity beyond expedience" and the need to teach
morality since it is not innate (Rolston, 265), Rolston concludes
that these Darwinists have taken some sort of leap of faith. Nothing
in their theories, Rolston argues, explains the rise of "enough
mental power to reflect over our evolutionary genesis and to generate
an ethic about what ought to be in the light of [what] is" (Rolston,
269). Rolston suggests that Ruse is less "guilty" of the
naturalistic fallacy when he states more forcefully that "the good is
simply that which evolution through selection has led us to regard as
good" (Rolston, quoting Ruse, 263). Here at least, there is no
apparent inconsistency between theory and action.
I do not believe that there is inconsistency on the part of Wilson or
Dawkins either. When Dawkins suggests that we should teach morality,
he is aware that there are natural causes for his saying so.
Darwinian selection, he understands, has led him via the leash of
culture to believe in such a value. Likewise, Wilson's belief in
biodiversity does not refer to some extraterrestrial Truth, but is
grounded in his own Darwinian history. Rolston falls short in his
argument that Wilson and Dawkins contradict themselves because he
does not prove that they believe their moral actions to be
un-naturalizable. To the contrary, Rolston spends a good portion of
his book explaining exactly how such moral behaviors are modeled by a
theory that includes self-deceptive ethics within its plausibility
space. It is illogical to argue that a theory which naturalizes
"ethics" cannot coincide with an "ethical" theorizer. In fact, it
would be surprising within the context of their theory for Wilson and
Dawkins to be amoral. If pressed, would not both adopt Ruse's stance
that the only good is that which selection leads us to view as good,
all the while maintaining the currently selected good (however
self-deluding) in their own lives?
At this point, having posed doubt as to the existence of
inconsistency, one must address the substance of the sociobiological
argument itself. As nonintuitive as some may be, there are
explanations which account for almost all "moral" behaviors in terms
of Darwinian theory. We do not harm our post-reproductive
grandparents because they may help us raise our children while we
attend to material needs (the so-called "Grandmother Hypothesis" of
evolutionary psychology). We enjoy music because the rhythm is in
concert with the beating of our mother's heart during gestation, the
time when our neurological circuits are developing. (This hypothesis
is taught in introductory biology at Swarthmore. If that is not
convincing enough, whales with slower heart beats respond to slower
rhythms, while birds with faster heart beats respond to faster
rhythms. In addition, the adrenaline rush we get from music is
believed to be a product of an evolutionary past in which wolves
would howl to instill bravery in the pack so that members would be
willing to give up their lives for a kill... and the list continues).
Martin Luther King, Jr. and Gandhi sought fame, power and a greater
probability that their offspring could live reproductive lives, all
the while deluding themselves into believing that they were serving a
larger good. Love is an illusion, a psychological trick which gets
us to stop searching for our most compatible mate in the world (whom
we shall in reality never find) in favor of assuring that the more
modest but essential task of passing on our genes is accomplished.
The point of all this unpleasant hypothesizing is that one certainly
cannot dismiss sociobiology on grounds that it fails to provide
universal explanations. Whatever else Wilson and others may be
guilty of, they cannot be accused of having modest aims. However
untenable these explanations are to some, the fact remains that there
is evidence supporting all of them, and to dismiss this evidence out
of a vague, undefined sense of discomfort is an unfortunate mistake.
If such a view of Martin Luther King, Jr. and Gandhi is nonintuitive,
perhaps it is such because we have, like them, convinced ourselves of
an ahistorical altruistic ideal that does not exist. I realize that
what one is in danger of doing is fitting the phenomena to the
theory, rather than formulating a theory that fits the data. If one
assumes that Darwinian evolution will account for all phenomena, then
it is likely that one could devise a theory to explain any action,
moral or otherwise. Maybe, but the reason that sociobiology is being
posited as an explanation for something as profound as human ethics
in the first place is that the theory is powerful and, by its very
nature, explains enormous amounts of data. This may be circular, but
I do not think that it is. I think it is only circular from the
truly solipsistic perspective that no theory could ever reduce human
morality.
There is a question of whether sociobiology is a science. There is
data supporting kin selection in bees and reciprocal altruism in
primates, but is there evidence supporting the Grandmother
Hypothesis? Perhaps there is no numerical evidence (how exactly
would one go about conducting such a study?), but no theory that
speculates as to the causes of morality is going to be universally
verifiable in the sense of the rigorous scientific method. At some
point, one must conclude that a threshold has been reached, and that
the theory is valid on a larger scale than is specifically warranted
by the data. At such a point, theories such as the ones listed above
are developed to model a wider and wider pool of phenomena, until a
more satisfying and unifying Theory comes along to model all data...
...and this is the problem. Our alternatives are explaining ethics,
for understanding what motivates the Good Samaritan, are quite
unsatisfying. If morality is not Darwinizable, one is left to give
vague non-answers such as "anything that exists is of value" or "I
don't know," or one can turn to religion. The options are few for
explaining the presence or absence of intrinsic value in the natural
world.
Rolston claims that because "there is no evidence even that
altruistic persons are increasing in the genetic pool over selfish
ones [let alone pseudo-altruistic self-deceivers]" (Rolston, 255),
there is no well-grounded evidence for the sociobiological assertion
that self-deceiving ethics is of adaptive value. Here, Rolston is
discounting his own admission that non-human, wild nature is amoral
(Rolston, 286). Morality is a uniquely human concern, arising from
the emergence of consciousness and conscience in a single species
(which is probably the most interesting event in biological history).
As such, psychological stability becomes an issue where it was not
before-- we may be motivated by our consciences as well as our
reproductive drives; so much so that "genetic pools" may no longer
adequately describe all of what it means to be "fit."
That Rolston fails to take into account uniquely human psychological
motivations is apparent in his repeated reference to transmission
processes that are "neural, not genetic" (Rolston, 328). This
distinction does not exist, for the human brain is under genetic
control as is every other organ in the body. The idea that something
can be "neural, not genetic" is reminiscent of the arguments used
against Darwinian theory when it first appeared (the brain is far too
privileged to have evolved naturally), and indeed of Darwin's own
reluctance to mention human intellect in Origin of Species. The
brain is malleable, but only in so far as the genes allow. Guilt,
and therefore much of conscience, surely has a physiological basis
just as fear, joy and anger do. Unlike in the amoral world, guilt
becomes a motivating force in humans, one which runs parallel to the
purely reproductive drives more commonly conceived of as Darwinian.
If this is so, then looking at "genetic pools" is insufficient. The
alleviation of physiological guilt is a force that must be considered
in assessing the adaptive fitness rendered by being moral.
It is no wonder that Rolston finds biological explanations
implausible for explaining the universality of religion and ethics,
for his approach is often to look for direct connections between
reproductive fitness and the emergence of sustained
religions/moralities in all corners of the universe. This is an
approach that is bound to fail, for, while sociobiology dictates
natural causes, it assumes a metaphoric leash through which such
causes create effects. The phenomenon of religion is several steps
removed from reproductive fitness, but nonetheless finds its roots
there. Culture, the transmission of ideas via neural systems that
are genetically capable of absorbing those ideas, forms the leash
that connects biology to belief. The main point made by Wilson and
Ruse is not that being altruistic today directly increases the
likelihood that one's genes will be passed on, but that this was one
day true, and that leashed culture has maintained the remnants of
this once-direct relationship via the psychological tricks of guilt,
self-delusion, etc. We may not produce more offspring if we are
moral, but we will through our actions "release" the naturally
derived and culturally mediated sense of obligation and compassion
that we all experience.
Rolston argues ultimately that culture and morality are too
interconnected and too complex to be reducible. "In culture, one can
gain enlarged interests and so an enlarged sense of identity...the
cultural self comes to transcend, even to replace, in part, the
biological self" (Rolston, 281). But the eye is complex and
interconnected-- and also reducible. Rolston is, as he does in
chapters 1 and 2, scrambling one's sense of what level is central to
the phenomenon of selection. When he claims that "in the larger
history value develops and diversifies dramatically, [removing] moral
overtones from nature while conserving value present over the
millennia of natural history," (Rolston, 286) Rolston is exchanging
metaphors. This is satisfying and warranted, for it exchanges the
misplaced connotations of selfishness for the more accurately
descriptive idea of distributed value. What becomes problematic is
the attempt to twist selection into a multileveled process that
somehow coordinates itself into a value-generating machine. While
eloquently argued, I think this type of worldview fails to extend the
"realm of possibility" in a meaningful way. Its value is solely in
supplying new words to the vocabulary through which we talk about the
role of genes in morality, not in redefining that role. There is no
science which backs up the argument for ecosystemic and populational
natural selection.
To sum up, I do not think that there is a naturalistic paradox, nor
that the explanations for morality raised by sociobiological theory
can be dismissed without careful consideration. Within the
psychological dimension of the theory is room for one to act
ethically and to promote ethical behavior, even as one understands
that such a stance is firmly rooted in Darwinian development. The
most reasonable belief is that "evolution explains why we believe
that we should love our fellow beings" (Rolston, quoting Ruse, 271).
Rolston's success is in reminding us that this realization is not
inherently negative. Rather, it is a realization that leashes us
humans firmly within the evolutionary network of a natural universe
that has proven itself capable of remarkable genesis.
Ben Geller
Swarthmore College
bgeller1@swarthmore.edu
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