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Subject: Russell Stannard's 'The God Experiment - Can Science Prove the
Existence of God?'
From: Jeff Dahms
Email: <jwdahms@wisdoc.net>
The Mccollough Sons of Thunder gospel brass band were in full flight in
Harlem's 125th St United House of Prayer for the People. Along with everyone
else I applauded wildly and swayed and stomped my feet in unison - and
thought of Russell Stannard. His latest book, 'The God Experiment' has
glowing reviews on the dust cover. They locate it as a landmark in the
increasingly crowded, even fashionable, intellectual arena of the science
religion dialogue. In the jubilant, resonating church I felt perfectly at
home. I find the religious impulse supremely worthy and humanly defining and
precious in my own life though my own metaphysic is that of an enthusiastic
non-theist, a scientist and committed naturalist. Yet, while reading Russell
Stannard's book, I felt completely akilter, though I should say at the
outset that some of my difficulty with the book is generic and not specific
to Stannard. Given that, the following comments are meant gently, as coming
from a supporter of the worth of the religious impulse but also as coming
from someone who feels that much of the field is mistakenly construed and
serving neither the good purposes of science or religion.
The most fundamental issue in this regard is whether science and religion
are the kinds of cognitive activities that can be said to interact in any
way at all. In common with many who write in the field, Stannard takes this
interaction as given. My own view, which I'll simply state here, is somewhat
akin to Steven Gould's - science and religion are 'non overlapping
magisteria' occupying different branches in our cognitive evolution. They
are part of a number of distinct and discrete human cognitive domains which
neither interact with one another nor translate one to another. The science
religion discussion might profitably be part of a much larger question about
the nature of these domains.
Russell Stannard with his command of science and knowledge of theology can
very ably speak from both platforms. He lays out most of the questions as
they are currently being construed by many writers in the field. One gets
the sense of an honest man willing to pursue the issues without avoiding any
of the discomfort to be found in difficult areas.
Idiosyncratic science and religion
Writers in this field often have idiosyncratic views of both science and
their particular religion, melding them in a kind of personal testament.
Stannard's book is explicitly like this.
His is a view of science that allows for supernatural causality - miracles.
He would like to limit this to special occasions like the resurrection as
found in the Anglican Christian tradition, but he also allows for miraculous
healing - supernatural intervention in the causal order. This necessarily
locates his scientific view within that small subset of scientists who would
allow for supernatural explanation in science. Whilst Stannard would limit
supernatural explanation to the above specific areas, once it is introduced
there is no necessary restriction in extending it to other areas. One can
then, for example, hypothesize local creation miracles as the intelligent
design advocates have done - albeit obliquely. But miraculous explanation is
either in or out of science; there is no middle ground.
From his religious viewpoint, Stannard would like to rule out many biblical
accounts of the miraculous that are dear to the hearts of most members of
his tradition. The result, whilst it might be a 'fit' for Stannard, is
likely to be unsatisfying both to scientists at large and to mainstream
members of his tradition. For the reader, the problem is what to make of the
potential science compatibility of, say, the broader views held by
Stannard's Christian denomination. This is not so much an error on his part,
as a problem generic to the whole undertaking, wherein the common approach
is 'This is my special view of science; this is my particular take on my
religious tradition; here is how they intersect.'
Russell Stannard is a deeply committed Christian, and of course the book is
written from the perspective of the committed. Stannard is perfectly
forthright about this and, at times, the book feels like a mix of
philosophical analysis and Sunday sermonizing. We are given a tour of the
science religion intersections or overlap areas as well as many examples of
the way in which issues of interaction or conflict are handled there - a
tour of the arguments and the resolutions that Russell Stannard himself
finds attractive. Thus, he frequently ends a chapter with a summary like,
'Some will not find this approach or these arguments convincing but I do.'
Stannard is right. A reader without Stannard's predisposing views is likely
to find many of the arguments unconvincing and the language specific only to
a particular religious community. Obviously, strong psychological biases
deeply predispose cognitive evaluation of data and argument in any arena,
from alien abductions to Florida electoral processes. Unfortunately, the
only revelation in the end is often simply that the writer is deeply
committed to those biases. Again this is a perennial issue in the
science/religion arena, so what is my particular objection?
Well, the truth of a statement then comes to depend upon who is the intended
reader. Language like 'God wanted to get across to us something of his
splendor and majesty' to an outsider is incomprehensibly anthropomorphic.
Very likely a member of the same faith will read along contentedly and feel
strongly reassured. The problem, if the book is also addressed to the
sympathetic 'outsider,' is that the book's arguments feel more like
illustrations in a sermon to the faithful than arguments meant to carry some
sway in the broader culture.
The prayer experiment
Stannard's overarching view is that science and religion have very much in
common. Science is a little more experimentally ambiguous, tentative and
broadly inferential than we are commonly led to think, and theology is
likewise more empirically approachable. Science and religion, he believes,
have quite similar methodologies; they make continual progress over time;
they share insights which are mutually beneficial, they even cross fertilize
each other's ideas.
For this reason, he devotes his opening chapter to a major experimental
realization of this view. This itself illustrates the deep dilemmas just
beneath the surface of this kind of melding of science and religion that are
easier to gloss over in the more abstract discussions.
The chapter describes a current multi-center trial of the efficacy of prayer
in enhancing the surgical outcome for 600 coronary artery surgery patients,
results due in 2002. There is a substantial body of reporting now in the
literature of studies like this, though not on this scale. The implicit
message of this and related studies is, 'We are just out there doing the
science like any other regular scientists and letting the chips fall where
they may.'
This is a large and expensive study, and obviously of serious intent, at
least in terms of the effort and monies invested. It is centered at the New
England Deaconess Hospital at Boston. Stannard is a trustee of the
foundation funding the study, and it is illustrative of his central thesis -
the exploration of the extent to which theology can be regarded as a
science.
But something very different to normal science is going on here, and I do
not just mean the investigation of a supernatural effect. At first glance,
it looks like a large scale experiment in an area where the preliminary work
suggests something interesting might be happening. Something interesting, of
course, would be a gross understatement, since what is being suggested is
the reproducible measurement of supernatural phenomena. It is not just a
routine study, like the many thousands of others which map psychosomatic
functions such as 'How having a positive outlook, a strong set of personal
beliefs or going to church, etc., can improve medical outcomes.' He is
explicit - the study aims to specify a supernatural outcome. Fundamental
issues underlie this experiment and reflect on the whole field of the
current science/religion debate. They are worthy of detailed analysis and
will be considered elsewhere in Metanexus.
Theology progresses just like science.
The following example is characteristic of the way many issues are
considered in the book. Stannard argues that there is genuine progress in
theology just as in science - that changes in the understanding of God
represent real progress, just like in science, and are not simply occasions
of 'people recreating God in their own image.' In other words, this is the
argument at hand: that there is a ladder of progress in the understanding of
God in Judaeo/Christian history, where God uses the culture of the day to
incrementally reveal some aspect of himself.
Stannard's basis for this view is that were it otherwise only forgiving
people would think of god as forgiving and the rich would think of him as
powerful and so on. Since he doesn't think this is the case, God must be
directing the process, and we are discovering God directly, independent of
our personal biases. He claims that God uses historical circumstance to
reveal his characteristics. E.g. Stannard quotes from the perspective of the
rich Isaiah in the king's court in the old testament of the bible.
The thesis Stannard advances implies that the most recent theology is the
most evolved. Even people in the same religious denomination have widely
varying God notions and certainly between religions there are vast
differences. Consider the current moves in some quarters of Christianity to
feminize a traditional male God. Is this the latest evolutionary development
with God using the rise of feminism to reveal her female side? What of other
Christian traditions and other religions that will have no part of it? Are
they simply wrong? What of historical Christian perspectives, the crusades,
the inquisition, slavery? People of the time thought they were carrying out
the will of God; thought they had the most up to date revealed understanding
of their deity.
How is one meant to decide something like this when every religious group or
individual on the planet can argue thus? It would seem extraordinary to
select out one historical strand, for example, Christianity, as the one
religion that maps the reality of God, and then to define changes within
this particular religion as progress. For what then can be said to be
happening within theological perspectives other than one's chosen own?
Moreover, the "progress" within, between, and amongst religions and
theological perspectives is such as to appear totally contradictory. To any
one but the totally committed believer there is a transparently obvious
explanation; namely, that God or gods are continuously being constructed
completely by the individual or culture. One may have personal preferences
but no external measure can decide between them.
Proposing that theology progresses just like science is an enormous
epistemological claim. Moreover, such commentary like Stannard's doesn't
have the feel of an argument. It leaves the reader wondering whether this
text is simply intended only for the committed who really need hear no
argument. Standing in a pulpit announces one is delivering a sermon. Writing
a book such as this suggests that something different is going on, something
more like open inquiry. Russell Stannard never suggests anything neutral
about his own point of view, but he would imply that one should consider his
arguments on their merits.
Theology and science are actually close kin
Stannard's broadest thesis is that science and theology are actually close
kin. He feels that they both share the same general difficulties in
developing hypotheses from a broad sweep of data, that the development of
their models/ideas have close parallels, and even that they cross fertilize
each other's ideas. It is particularly in this territory that the reader
gets the impression that the book is written for the easy sweeping vision of
the committed.
Consider the examples Stannard uses.
The theological view at the time of Saint Augustine was that God is
timeless. Augustine therefore concluded there was no time before the
creation. Stannard suggests this prefigures relativity, big bang cosmology,
and so on. He also suggests that since Niels Bohr is known to have read
Kierkegaard, this may have influenced Bohr's interpretation of early quantum
mechanics. The fact that theology has a vision in which God is both
everywhere and also local leads to or parallels the wave/particle electron
model. It's an enormous reach to think of science and theology being in the
same harness based on tenuous examples like these. Furthermore, Stannard
reminds us that many scientists historically have also been religious
believers. But why would this count as evidence for the kinship of science
and religion? Almost by definition scientists reflect the dominant
influences of the culture of their time. E.g. They often reflect the ethical
or political views of their time.
Stannard suggests that the need to weigh up the evidence from many sources
is a comparable activity in both science and religion. Theory in fields like
cosmology certainly depends on many experimental and theoretical
underpinnings. Its strength comes from the way many widely different
elements dovetail exquisitely. But this is not simply viewing a loose
assembly of ideas, like viewing a collage from a distance and asking what it
suggests. Many supporting elements must tightly lock together to make a
theory, and a single significant element that doesn't fall into place is a
serious problem for that theory. It is often the only clue that we have to
go back and start all over again.
Consider the state cosmology would be in if, say, the background radiation
had failed to turn up in the extremely narrow temperature range predicted,
and with just the right degree of micro fluctuation, to allow for the
development of galaxies. It is failures of subtle contributing elements like
this which often tell scientists they have to go back to their drawing
boards and start over with a totally new theory. E.g. A universe of four
forces may soon have a fifth as a consequence of recent very subtle cosmic
expansion measurements. Theology does not seem to even remotely parallel
such an activity. It is far too elastic -some would argue infinitely
elastic- to have anything like the requisite sensitivity to operate like the
scientific theories Stannard mentions.
The mapping of theology on cosmology is emblematic of the problem. Back in
the fifties when big bang theory was competing with steady state/continuous
creation, no one in the religious community was placing their bets. No one
committed themselves to positions in advance, such as 'Our theology, our
religious vision, depends on the outcome of these competing scientific
theories. If big bang theory goes down, so does the whole underpinning of
our theology.' And yet, with big bang theory currently in the ascendant, we
have a spate of books showing how that particular theory is consistent with
and supports particular theologies. If steady state was now the rage,
however, we'd no doubt have the same spate of books showing how it was
consistent with the same theology. This is elasticity on a scale that
science couldn't countenance. In science, there is no prize if you're not
actually in the game.
Science religion interaction and some difficulties
Stannard's religion would seem to lie somewhere in the mainstream. It is
much less adventurous than that of some theologians who flirt with
philosophic naturalism or a post modernist theology in which
'truth/knowledge is all of a kind, equally arbitrary, socially constructed
and so on.' Thus, he takes the interaction issues square on without
flinching. He is, in the end, a philosophic dualist in the Cartesian
tradition and realizes the difficulties of this philosophically
unfashionable position. Nonetheless, he argues that God probably interacts
with the world in a way parallel to whatever way minds interact with brains.
This is odd for one whose position is that theology is much like science.
Arguing by very loose analogy to a posited relationship for which one in
turn has no explanation looks nothing like science. This is meaningless
except as a way of simply asserting that "I don't understand this but I
believe it." He furthermore accepts a traditional 'God of the gaps' argument
in which it is suggested that the constants of physics were set up by God.
(Some of them have an extremely narrow possible range which allows for the
development of complexity in the universe and eventually maybe something
like us). Stannard feels that theoretical progress in accounting for the
value of these constants has been slow and may fail - though some current
string/gravitation theorists might strongly disagree. The perennial risk in
relying on 'gaps' arguments, even long standing ones, is that they may be
filled, and the history of all of these positions is ignominious serial
retreat.
Other issues
Stannard seems somewhat discomforted by the proliferation of miracles in the
Christian traditions and is keen to pare them down to the resurrection of
Christ and miracles of healing. He rejects the wilder explanations of these
- the universe finely tuned from the very outset to naturally produce such
miracles or the subtle intervention in quantum indeterminacy - in favor of
'God just intervenes.' The laws of physics are not broken, they are nested
in a higher law, 'the law of love,' much like Newtonian Physics is nested in
the current Standard model in physics. Stannard understands that some
readers will have difficulty with such mixed language, and he is right. It
is a theological statement even though formatted with a few scientific
notions and is incomprehensible to a scientist.
'Original sin', for example, is roughly equivalent to the downside of our
genetic predisposition which can be transcended by the independent power of
the mind. The problem is that if you grant genetic determinism this much
power over the mind in the first place, then the assumed over-riding by the
mind is suspect. The behaviours we approve of can just as reasonably be
considered genetically determined. The outcome is then a toss of the genetic
coin, so whence virtue?
Stannard also sees the four dimensional space time block of relativity
theory as supporting the theological notion of God outside time. A
concomitant problem is that if God creates/relates to the universe 'en
block', presumably it is that much harder to disengage God from
responsibility for suffering and evil. And the suffering of humanity and
animals, he finds a difficult call.
His explanations for said suffering go something like this:
* some suffering is useful
* animals may not suffer as much as they seem to
* human suffering is actually God suffering
* in the end there is heavenly reward to make up for it and no suffering
goes on forever. (I suspect given the choice, those suffering in extremis
would trade eternal 'pie in the sky at a later date' for immediate release)
and his explanations even seem to leave Stannard with considerable angst.
Stannard also has some unusual scientific views that might invite comment
like:
* genes for a stronger sex drive predispose some men to rape
* the working class and presumably less intelligent are out-breeding the
upper class who are typically more intelligent, and this is driving the
average intelligence of the species to the dogs
* the Heisenberg uncertainty principle is a consequence of observer
interaction altering a property in the process of measurement and is not an
intrinsic feature of these paired properties.
But these must perhaps be better addressed at some other time.
Concluding Remark
Stannard's account is honest and very able, coming from someone enormously
experienced in both theology and science. It is this honesty which points up
the problems in this whole approach and the above criticisms are, thus,
perhaps more generic than specific to Stannard's book.
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