What is embedded or embodied morality? As we try to become more in tune with, more at home in, this world in which we find ourselves, do we become increasingly guilty of committing the naturalistic fallacy, of converting our comfortable "is" into an obligatory "ought"? Or do we come closer and closer to a sure knowledge of ourselves, and thus of what is right and wrong for ourselves? How natural are our natural reactions? Moreover, how enculturated are they? As Pascal observes in his Pensees: "I am much afraid that nature is itself only a first custom [culture], as custom [culture] is a second nature." So, how do we determine morality on the basis of a nature that is nothing but a kind of sub- or unconscious culture?

In today's column, Heather Looy, associate professor of psychology at The King's University College in Alberta, Canada, explores the role that disgust plays both naturally and culturally in our understanding of morality. As she observes in the abstract to her paper:

"Theologically, the Judeo-Christian tradition uses disgust and related concepts of abomination and impurity in conjunction with moral codes designed to preserve communal identity as the people of God. Psychosocial research reveals disgust as a universal emotion that enables evaluation and regulation of one class of moral behaviors, and serves to express and preserve cultural identity. Neurobiology is beginning to trace the neural circuitry involved in disgust and morality, suggesting emotions are the basis for moral judgement, and revealing intriguing relationships between disgust, morality, and other aspects of the psyche."

But if emotion, and not reason, is the basis for human morality, is the naturalistic fallacy that fallacious after all? What roles do emotion and reason play in the instantiating of morality as disgust? Read on to explore some of the possible answers to these questions. Also, a list of references as well as notes and the paper's abstract are to be found at the end of the column.

As previously mentioned, Heather Looy is an associate professor of psychology at The King's University College, a Christian liberal arts college in Edmonton, Alberta, Canada. She received her Ph.D. in 1991 from McMaster University in Hamilton, Ontario. She teaches courses in brain and behavior, evolution, genes and behavior, perception, cognition, learning and memory, and research methods. She is a biopsychologist by training and her theoretical and empirical research interests reflect her passion for questions about human embodiment and embeddedness in creation, for finding interconnections across subdisciplines and disciplines; and for integrating questions of faith and psychological science. They include the biopsychology and evolutionary psychology of sexuality and gender (sexual orientation, intersexuality); food preferences, disgust, and culture; biology and human nature; and ecopsychology.

--Stacey E. Ake

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Subject: Disgust, Morality, and Human Identity: A Neurobiological, Psychosocial and Theological Investigation From: Heather Looy Email: <hlooy@KingsU.ab.ca>

Introduction

Humans are universally moral beings. We have the capacity, tendency, and motivation to evaluate objects, events, and behaviors as good or bad. The specific applications of this moral sensibility, however, vary across historical, cultural, and religious locations. In our efforts to resolve the dilemmas that occur as diverse moral frameworks increasingly conflict in our shrinking world, scholars seek a deeper understanding of the sources, functions, and nature of human morality. That this task has borne limited fruit attests both to the fact that morality is a broad-ranging, enormously complex phenomenon, and that questions of human morality touch on our most basic beliefs about the world.

Scholars not surprisingly contribute different worldviews and disciplinary allegiances to their understanding of morality. For example, some understand morality as evolved neurobiological processes manifested in psychobehavioral adaptations that ultimately serve the interests of our genes. Others view morality as sociocultural constructions that contribute to social stability but are infinitely flexible, unconstrained by evolutionary biology, neural organization, or transcendent truth. Still others argue that morality is a property of a disembodied human rationality, perhaps in correct relationship with a nonmaterial divinity who determines and communicates moral laws.

This admittedly oversimplified list reveals the diversity of perspectives on human morality. Each involves an unnecessary degree of reductionism and simplification. It is the complexity of morality that we most urgently need to acknowledge and examine as we struggle to understand and appropriately respond to events such as the terrorist attacks on the U.S. in September, 2001. There is tremendous potential to enrich and transform our understanding of human morality through interdisciplinary investigations, based on a view of human nature as a multidimensional unity (see Anderson, 1998; Brown, 1998; Jeeves, 1997, pp. 98-126), that includes real, irreducible, and mutually interdependent spiritual, relational, emotional, rational, and physiological facets.

To illustrate this vision with a relatively simple example, I begin with the emotion of disgust. [1] Disgust is deeply rooted in our bodies, both viscerally and neurally, and therefore reflects our embodiment and evolutionary history. Disgust is a "moral emotion", involving evaluation of rightness or wrongness. Human relationality is expressed by the fact that the triggers of disgust are learned in community, and play a crucial role in cultural identity. Finally, many disgust triggers are linked explicitly to divine expectations, reflecting human spirituality. We cannot understand the nature and meaning of disgust and its role in human morality without taking seriously all of these dimensions.

A systematic study of disgust from multiple perspectives would enrich our understanding of human morality as simultaneously embodied, cultural, and spiritual. It further provides a model for scholars to explore the roles of other emotional, perceptual, cognitive and neural processes involved in human morality. This essay is an initial attempt to identify the major issues, questions, and contributions that theology, the social sciences, and neurobiology have to offer this enterprise, and an invitation to scholars with expertise in these fields to respond.

Embodied morality: Natural moral law

For the purposes of this paper, I define morality, or "moral sensibility", as the universal human capacity and motivation to evaluate objects, events and behaviors as good or bad, right or wrong. In theology, the concept of "natural moral law" refers to the belief that this universal human capacity is innately embedded in human nature. Aristotle argued that everything has a telos, or final purpose, and any action that moves something toward its final purpose is "good". Medieval theologians, particularly Thomas Aquinas, drew on this idea to argue that God placed laws into creation that, if obeyed, would lead humans to their highest good or final purpose. The Hebrew and Christian scriptures speak of God's law being written on people's hearts (e.g., Jeremiah 31:33, Romans 2:14-15, Hebrews 8:10; 10:15). The concepts of "common grace" and "general revelation" also capture the idea that God has placed within humankind the capacity to discern right from wrong and a general agreement about what is right and wrong. Natural moral law differs from other laws of nature in that, while humans have the capacity to discern and obey them, we are not compelled, but have the freedom to disobey them (Lewis, 1942).

This concept of natural moral law is controversial, at least in the Christian tradition. The notion that God writes this knowledge on people's hearts can be interpreted as an innate moral wisdom available to everyone by virtue of their humanity (e.g., Lewis, 1942), but can also be understood as something that occurs only when a person joins the community of believers (McKenna, 1997). Further, if people naturally know what is good, and have the capacity and motivation to act in ways that promote the good, then we might expect more widespread agreement on moral laws and less difficulty in obeying them. We must also avoid the naturalistic fallacy, the belief that what is natural is how things ought to be: natural = good.

Nevertheless, the idea of an innate natural moral law is consistent with a multidimensional view of human nature, with the belief that morality is reflected not solely spiritually, but as an embodied and psychologically experienced phenomenon. This allows us to explore the implications of evolutionary theory, neurobiology, and psychology for human morality, without marginalizing its real spiritual aspect, and without necessarily accepting the philosophical naturalism that frequently imbues these fields. Even within faith traditions, we find morality expressed in sociocultural and emotional terms. For example, the Hebrew scriptures claim that God's moral law is given to a particular community for particular purposes, including a strong sense of communal identity and purpose. Further, obedience to those laws is explicitly linked to emotional states, in particular, disgust (Kekes, 1992; Stout, 1988, pp. 145-162). In Leviticus, violations of Hebrew laws are frequently described as abominations, which are by definition objects of disgust (e.g. Leviticus 11:13, 18). The Hebrew prophets called acts of disobedience abominations in God's sight (e.g., Isaiah, Jeremiah, Ezekiel, Amos). The psalms speak of the faithless as disgusting (Psalm 119:158), and the Christian scriptures speak of God spitting out the weakly committed, a classic disgust reaction (Revelation 3:16).

Embedded morality: Morality and cultural identity

But what is disgust? What role does it play in enabling us to evaluate and regulate behavior in terms of moral categories, and what does it tell us about the function of morality in human life? To answer this question, we first need a sketch of morality from a psychosocial perspective.

Morality appears to be uniquely human (although see Flack & deWaal, 2000; but also Kagan, 2000). Culture is also uniquely human, and highly varied. This variation includes the application of moral sensibility; that is, how objects, events, and behaviors are evaluated. These cross-cultural differences support the suggestion that one function of morality is to establish and maintain cultural identity. That is, "we" do this, eat that, and shun those, unlike "them". This helps us know who we are, our place and purpose in the order of things (Douglas, 1966).

Of course, morality addresses much more than those behaviors concerned with cultural identity and purity. Shweder, Much, Mahapatra and Park (1997) propose that we classify moral codes as reflecting autonomy, community, or divinity. When we morally evaluate, the criteria we use draw primarily upon one of these three categories. Autonomy emphasizes individual rights and preferences, while Community focuses on one's social role and the importance of sustaining social systems and institutions. These are relevant and important dimensions of human morality, but for present purposes I will focus on the category of Divinity. When we engage in moral evaluation using the criteria of Divinity we address personal purity (physical and spiritual), cultural identity, divine expectations, and natural law, sin, and defilement. This bears obvious connections to the theological concept of natural moral law.

The divinity code has been explored by several social scientists, among them anthropologists (Douglas, 1966; Shweder et al., 1997) and psychologists (e.g., Rozin, Lowery, Imada & Haidt, 1999). It also appears in philosophical and theological discourse on ethics (e.g., Kekes, 1992; Stout, 1988). These scholars have convincingly established the existence of a divinity-based moral code, present to some degree in (presumably) all human cultures.

Embedded morality: Disgust in psychosocial perspective

Social scientists have also examined the psychological foundations of human morality. While some scholars have focused on the rational cognitive processes involved in moral reasoning (Gilligan, 1982; Kohlberg, 1971), more recently others have argued that human morality is based primarily on emotions (Haidt, Koller & Dias, 1993; Rozin et al., 1999). Cross-cultural studies suggest that moral evaluations are best predicted by emotional responses, a "gut reaction" which is then justified rationally (Haidt et al., 1993). Emotions can also act as powerful regulators of our own behavior. Imagine behaving in an activity you find disgusting, such as eating pork if you are Jewish or a "moral vegetarian", a homoerotic act or even drinking alcohol if you are a particular subtype of Christian. Your disgust significantly reduces the likelihood that you will engage in such acts.

The emotions associated with moral violations include guilt, shame, fear, anger, and contempt, but disgust has generated the most recent interest (Haidt, Rozin, McCauley & Imada, 1997; Rozin, Markwith & Stoess, 1997). Disgust has been explicitly linked to the divinity code: moral violations that involve desecration, certain sins, or acts that disrupt the perceived natural order of things tend to elicit disgust (Rozin et al., 1999; Rozin et al., 1997). These include, for North Americans, eating human flesh, seeing an eviscerated dead body, engaging in an incestuous relationship, spitting upon another person, or eating insects (Rozin & Fallon, 1987; Wood & Looy, 2000).1 Globally, disgust triggers fall into one of three categories: body envelope violations, sex taboos, and food taboos (Rozin & Fallon, 1987).

Disgust is one of six basic human emotions (Ekman, 1992). It is universally experienced as a visceral rejection, even nausea, and is universally recognized through its distinctive facial expression (Rozin, Lowery & Ebert, 1994; Steiner, 1979). It has roots in an innate rejection of bitter tastes, evident in other mammals and in human neonates (Steiner, 1979). This innate response has obvious survival benefits, since bitter-tasting substances are less likely to be nutritious and more likely to bear toxins than sweet-tasting substances. However in humans this "emotion of rejection" becomes highly elaborated, extending far beyond physical survival. Haidt et al. (1997) argue persuasively that the triggers of disgust are things that remind us forcibly of the animalness of our nature, and therefore of our "impurity" and degradation (Haidt et al., 1997). Disgust, therefore, "is best understood as the guardian of the temple of the body" (Haidt et al., 1997, p.114; see also Miller, 1997).

Triggers of disgust are both learned and context-dependent. Young children express disgust solely to bitter tastes, yet by 8 to 12 years of age, they have adopted the full array of adult disgust triggers in their particular culture. They also learn that disgust triggers are defined by their context. For example, while normally contact with feces makes one impure, the act of caring for a young infant both renders the feces somewhat less disgusting and, more importantly, releases the caregiver from moral condemnation for the contact. Further, disgusting acts performed under coercion confer less impurity than if one is perceived as having a choice.

Why do we so consistently and unfailingly socialize our children to reject certain objects, events, and behaviors, in particular contexts? Perhaps the purpose is to create and preserve cultural identity. This is seen very clearly with food. There is a vast array of edible, nourishing substances available to every cultural group, yet without exception, a given culture will accept only a limited subset. People who eat substances rejected by a particular culture are either confirmed as outsiders, or at least viewed as deviant. For example, the English once scorned the French for eating frogs and snails, and North Americans think anyone who voluntarily eats insects must be "primitive, barbaric, or desperate" (Forsyth, 1994, p.63). Notice that these are moral evaluations: particular foods are morally good or bad, and confer this quality to the people who eat them. Disgust acts as a signal that eating this particular food is morally wrong.

Thus disgust enables one to maintain cultural identity and purity by effectively avoiding or rejecting anything that might threaten it. Disgust keeps one accepted within the community, and recognizable as one of "our own". This sense of belonging is vital for human development and psychological well being. The fact that feral children, developing apart from human community, reportedly fail to show any disgust response is a case in point (Malson, 1964; cited in Haidt et al., 1997).

Embodied morality: Disgust in the brain?

If indeed "core disgust" (Rozin & Fallon, 1987) is innate, and if humans have throughout human evolutionary history elaborated this response in communal contexts, then we should expect disgust to be manifested in neurobiological systems, through natural selection. Is this the case? And are the neurobiological aspects of disgust and of morality related in ways that might illuminate their relationship?

Until recently, it was believed that human emotions involved a common neural system (mainly the limbic system; LeDoux, 1996); however there is now evidence that basic emotions involve separate neural systems (Phillips, Young, Scott, et al., 1998; Sprengelmeyer, Rausch, Eysel & Przuntek, 1998). This implies that the basic emotions evolved for different reasons and possibly at different times in evolutionary history. However, evolutionary psychology has not yet provided a specific and empirically supported account for the emergence of disgust (Cosmides & Tooby, 2000; Nesse, 1990; but see Darwin, 1965).

The neurobiological study of disgust has shown that facial expressions of disgust appear to involve activation of the basal ganglia, particularly the right anterior putamen and caudate nucleus, as well as the left anterior insular cortex (Sprengelmeyer et al., 1998; Phillips, Young, Scott et al., 1998; Phillips, Young, Senior, et al., 1997). These areas may also process responses to auditory disgust stimuli such as sounds of retching (Calder,Keane, Manes et al., 2000). The experience of disgust may involve similar regions (Calder et al., 2000; Sprengelmeyer, Young, Calder, et al., 1996), as well as the lateral cerebellum and the occipitotemporal cortex (Lane, Reiman, Ahern et al., 1997). These appear to be disgust-specific, instead of more generally processing perceptual abilities or basic emotions.

The specific regions involved in disgust are suggestive. The fact that the interior forebrain structures involved in disgust affect autonomic and neuroendocrine processes is consistent with the experience of disgust as literally a "gut" response. In primates, the anterior insula is the gustatory cortex, involved in the perception and hedonic evaluation of tastes and smells, in feeding and vomiting (Phillips et al., 1997). It also may be involved in language perception (Phillips et al., 1998). This is generally consistent with the observation that disgust in its unelaborated form involves a visceral response to smells and tastes that have been evaluated as unpleasant, and that visual and certain acoustic stimuli can become secondary conditioned stimuli for those tastes and smells. The caudate nucleus may be involved in stimulus-response learning (Sprengelmeyer et al., 1996). Disgust, as noted earlier, is elaborated through experience to be elicited by more complex events than unpleasant tastes and smells, and behavioral psychologists have long established that emotional responses are subject to simple and powerful stimulus-response conditioning processes.

Higher level integrative processing of all emotions involves several cortical regions. Adolphs, Damasio, Tranel and Damasio (1996) showed that recognition of facial expressions of emotion involves the right inferior parietal cortex and the right infracalarine cortex. However, Sprengelmeyer et al. (1998) showed that the left inferior frontal cortex is involved in recognition of the facial expressions of emotions of disgust, fear and anger. They suggest that "recognition of emotion is based on separate neural pathways; it is hypothesized that these pathways project to the inferior frontal cortex (Sprengelmeyer et al., 1998, p.1931). Lane et al. (1997) report that the experience and recall of emotions involve activation of the thalamus and medial prefrontal cortex, while Canli, Desmond, Zhao et al. (1998) further suggest this function is lateralized to the right hemisphere.

A close examination of these neurobiological studies of emotional perception and experience, however, shows critical differences across studies in methodology and sampling, and, while a few consistent observations are reported, there are many inconsistencies. At present there is insufficient data to confirm preliminary findings, and our limited understanding of neurobiology renders interpretation difficult. Nevertheless, the fact that the perception and experience of disgust are manifested in dedicated neural circuits has been well established.

None of this research, however, addresses the question of whether disgust is neurally linked with morality. To do that, we must first establish the neural systems involved in morality, then trace connections between these systems and those involved with disgust. Only recently has this question been directly addressed, interestingly, by an interdisciplinary team led by a philosopher. Researchers used fMRI to demonstrate that, when responding to moral dilemmas, people show activation of brain regions involved in emotional experience, including the medial frontal cortex, the posterior cingulate and anterior gyri, and not in frontal cortical areas known to be involved in judgement (Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, et al., 2001). This supports the psychological argument that moral evaluation is based primarily on emotion, not reason, and lends credence to the need to examine more closely the role of emotions in morality.

Morality and disgust in multidimensional, interdisciplinary perspective

Intriguing links emerge among these theological, psychosocial, and neurobiological perspectives on disgust and morality, some of which I have already alluded to. The psychological argument that disgust is the guardian of the temple of the body (Haidt et al., 1997) finds echoes in the Levitical laws that focus on uncleanness and impurity, and specify which foods, sex acts, and body envelope violations are not acceptable in the Israelite community. The concept of an innate moral law finds some support in observations that moral sensibility and reasoning are affected by brain damage, and that emotions themselves are both neurally embodied and the basis of moral judgement (Greene et al., 2001). The role of emotions in morality is also supported by psychosocial research that shows that emotional responses are better predictors of moral judgements than rational processes (Haidt et al., 1993), and that disgust emerges when someone comes to believe that certain acts are moral violations (Rozin et al., 1997).

This brief review of the literature on disgust and morality leads me to the following, very tentative, conclusions:

1. Natural moral law suggests that human morality is a universal, innate property of human nature. Whether this moral sensibility has a divine originor is merely a function of natural selection acting on random variations is at present a matter of worldview. However, its universality and inherent lack of compulsion is certainly consistent with the beliefs of many religious traditions that morality has a supernatural origin.

2. Morality is fundamentally expressed and controlled through emotions, especially disgust.

3. Because disgust responses are elaborated in community, and serve to maintain cultural identity, morality is a fundamentally relational, not merely individual, characteristic of human nature. This implies that morality cannot be understood in terms of abstract, absolute, rationally derived principles, but is rooted in human relationship and emotional connection.

4. If we are embodied unities (Jeeves, 1997), morality will be instantiated in neural circuits in the brain. The emotional aspects of morality have already been shown to be so embodied.

5. Since disgust and its role in morality is experientially elaborated, it is predicted that the neural systems involved are dynamic, and should show some plasticity over the lifespan.

Embodied morality: Directions for the future

There is obviously considerable theoretical and empirical work yet to be done before we have anything near a complete understanding of disgust and morality, let alone the relationships between other emotions and morality, and ultimately a nuanced analysis of human morality in general. This essay is, of necessity, an extremely sketchy review of general ideas and connections. I highlight here just a few of the problems and questions that need to be addressed.

First, as noted earlier, the concept of natural moral law, while helpful in exposing interconnections among spiritual, psychological and neurobiological aspects of morality, has its own problems. We run the risk of trivializing the roles of faith traditions and communities when we argue that human nature is inherently moral and has universal access to divine moral law. Further, a Jewish colleague reminded me that the terms translated "disgust" and "unclean" in Jewish tradition may not map directly onto the concept of disgust presented here and developed further in Rozin and Haidt's work (Samuel Spero, personal communication, June 5, 2001). A balanced and nuanced articulation of natural moral law is needed before we can appropriately relate it to other perspectives on disgust and morality.

Second, while disgust triggers seem "natural" to members of a particular group, and we are rarely consciously aware of how disgust helps us to maintain moral purity and cultural identity, on occasion people appeal to disgust as a touchstone against which we ought to judge the morality of particular things. For example, in response to an article on homosexuality (Looy, 1995), I received anonymously a clipping with the following quote: "...the feelings of disgust normal people feel upon hearing descriptions of such things are normally strengthened by family, religion, and educational influences, thereby preventing many people from succumbing to the temptation to commit unnatural acts" (Anonymous, 1987). This approach reverses the relationship between disgust and morality that has been articulated by social scientists. Instead of coming to feel disgust for those things deemed, on the basis of other criteria, morally threatening, disgust is used as the basis for determining what is immoral. Is this an appropriate use of disgust? The obvious cross-cultural diversity of disgust triggers, and the fact that disgust responses must be learned strongly suggest the answer is "no". However, if morality is innate, and if that innate morality includes knowledge of divine moral "laws", and if disgust enables us to obey those moral laws, then disgust might indeed be a signal for immorality, instead of solely a response. This is a potentially dangerous argument that can be refuted only through careful, systematic theoretical and empirical studies of natural moral law and the role of disgust.

Therefore we need theologians and philosophers to further explore natural moral law. They should also address some of the normative questions that arise from this research: For example, in what ways might disgust distort our moral sensibility? Ought disgust to be considered a "God-given" trait that ideally plays a part in the development of our morality and identity in particular historical and cultural contexts? Social scientists could contribute to this enterprise by examining the function of disgust in moral evaluations and its role in mediating individual well being and cultural identity. Psychologists could trace the co-development of disgust with moral evaluations and reasoning. Further, the neurobiological links among moral evaluations, moral reasoning, emotional, rational, and perceptual processes need much more extensive exploration, using techniques such as imaging, brain lesion studies, event-related potentials (ERPs), electroencephalography (EEG), and correlations among developmental disorders, psychopathological conditions, and morality. Tracing the neural systems involved will modify theological and social scientific theories about disgust and morality, and provide some clues regarding their roots, purpose, and embodied character. Inclusion of possible autonomic, endocrine and immune involvement in disgust and morality would extend our understanding of embodied morality beyond the brain and might identify physiological consequences of particular patterns of moral responding.

Our understanding of disgust and morality is in its infancy, yet technological advances in neurobiology, an increasing willingness to engage in interdisciplinary dialogue, to take religion seriously as a dimension of human nature and experience, and growing knowledge of cultural differences, have created a climate within which a breakthrough in our understanding of morality could soon occur. A key element, in my view, is a willingness to consider a multidimensional and unified, rather than a simple reductionistic, view of human nature (see Ashbrook, 1997; Brown, Murphy &
Maloney, 1998). I firmly believe that such interdisciplinary dialogue will contribute substantively to a rich, nuanced picture of human morality that does justice to its spiritual, relational, psychological, and physiological dimensions and its experiential complexity.

References

Adolphs, R., Damasio, H., Tranel, D. & Damasio, A. (1996). Cortical systems for the recognition of emotion in facial expressions. The Journal of Neuroscience, 16(23), 7678-7687.

Anderson, R. S. (1998). On being human: The spiritual saga of a creaturely soul. In W. S. Brown, N. Murphy & H. N. Maloney (Eds.), Whatever happened to the soul? Scientific and theological portraits of human nature. Minneapolis: Augsburg Fortress.

Anonymous (February, 1987). Untitled, excerpt. Fidelity, 23.

Ashbrook, J. B. (1997). 'Mind' as humanizing the brain: Toward a neurobiology of meaning. Zygon, 32(3), 301-320.

Brown, W. S. (1998). Cognitive contributions to soul. In W. S. Brown, N. Murphy & H. N. Maloney (Eds.), Whatever happened to the soul? Scientific and theological portraits of human nature. Minneapolis: Augsburg Fortress.

Brown, W. S., Murphy, N. & Malony, H. N. (Eds.). (1998). Whatever happened to the soul? Scientific and theological portraits of human nature. Minneapolis, Minnesota: Augsburg Fortress.

Calder, A. J., Keane, J., Manes, F., Antoun, N. & Young, A. W. (2000). Impaired recognition and experience of disgust following brain injury. Nature Neuroscience, 3(11), 1077-1078.

Canli, T., Desmond, J. E., Zhao, Z., Glover, G. & Gabrieli, J. D. (1998). Hemispheric asymmetry for emotional stimuli detected with fMRI. Neuroreport, 9(14), 3233-3239.

Cosmides, L. & Tooby, J. (2000). Evolutionary psychology and the emotions. In M. Lewis & J. M. Haviland-Jones (Eds.), Handbook of emotions. New York: Guildford. [On-line]". Republication for commercial purposes in print or electronic format requires the permission of the author. Copyright 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004 by Metanexus Institute.

Published   2001.12.03